Antonio Reyes-Rodríguez
Memory’s Modus Operandi And Input Processing: A Theoretical Model

Learning itself . . . means making some sort of change in those internal resources in the mind. And what we call ‘teaching’ is then simply helping someone else to make needed changes in his or her internal resources.
(Stevick 1999: 45)

ABSTRACT: It is compulsory for language teachers and SLA researchers and editors before editing a textbook to first observe, understand and reflect[1] on the way the mind processes information and acquires a new language. I present in this paper a model of analysis for the stages of input processing in the mind. Teachers’ role as ‘facilitators’ (Rogers 1983) demands from them to make the new information as accessible as possible. From the model proposed by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) on processing information acquired through sensorial input, I intend to go beyond the description of the internal relationship between the ‘short- and long-term memory’ (Baddeley 2006) and contribute proposing a theoretical model to explain the modus operandi of memory when new information is received. The analysis attempts to explain the occurrence of some communicative devices (implication, irony, sarcasm) from the perspective of memory. It also accounts for possible interpretations of learning obstacles such as intense stream of thoughts (intense presence of memories: perhaps derived from an extreme connection between the ‘short- and long-term memory’) and amnesia (Baddeley and Wilson 2002) (lack of memories perhaps derived from a lack of connections between the ‘short- and long-term memory’). This paper will provide possible explanations for a relation between memory flexibility, speed (Bialystok 2001) and age through Ehrman’s concept of ‘thin and thick ego boundaries’ (1999). Finally, I propose a methodological approach to speed up students’ learning process based on authentic texts and the role of motivation in the classroom.

I. Processing data in our memory: ‘Short- and long-term memory’

In processing information we must deal with two imaginary states, according to the structural model proposed by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) among others. This model explains the acquisition of sensorial input and the concepts of the process of scanning and searching, ‘long-term memory’ and ‘short-term memory’. Another concept related to those mentioned is the ‘working memory’ (Baddeley, 2000, 2003, 2006; Baddeley and Hitch 1974) or as Stevick prefers to call it, the ‘worktable’[2] (1996).

I.a. Neuropsychological distinction

Although the distinction between ‘short- and long-term memory’ has been accepted for some decades already, it is important to remember that this distinction is not arbitrarily proposed but empirically attested through experiments and observations: The ‘short-term memory’ is used, for instance, when a task is given to memorize, for a short period of time, a list of words. Strong support for the dichotomous view of memory comes from neuropsychological disassociation (Logie 1995), particularly a number of patients with neurological damage, like H.M. (Shimamura 1989). Following surgery for the relief of severe epilepsy, H.M. suffered bilateral damage to the temporal lobes and to the hippocampus. He had a very pronounced amnesia, and great difficulty in learning new information. Despite this, H.M. showed comparatively normal intelligence and normal ability to retain sequences of digits. Amnesic patients like H.M. provided evidence for damage to a ‘long-term memory’ system, but with intact short-term storage. The converse characteristic has also been found. For example patient K.F. (Shallice & Warrington 1970) suffered damage to the left parieto-occipital region following a motorcycle accident. While mildly aphasic, he had no general amnesia and long-term learning was normal. However, he could remember a sequence of only three digits.

These contrasting patterns of memory impairment in neuro-psychological patients who have had physical damage to specific memory-related parts of the mind provide biological evidence of a powerful process of double dissociation wherein the memory is divided into two distinct systems: the short- and the long-term memory.

I.b. Processing data

The model of data-processing in the memory (or, rather, dual ‘memories’) could be described as follows:

Through a process of attention (Schmidt 1990; Robinson 2003) and selection (van der Heijden 1992; Neumann 1996; Stevick 1996), new information is received in the ‘short-term memory’. The new data stay in the ‘short-term memory’ for a limited period of time (Deutsch and Deutsch 1975). Here, the new information is compared and related by means of connections with the information stored in the ‘long-term memory’ with a constant ‘two-way traffic’ between the inner resources (information available) of the ‘short- and long-term memory’. Through a relatively complex filter, the new information is then either kept and stored in the long-term memory, or released (forgotten).

II. The constant ‘two-way traffic’ between the ‘short- and long-term memory’

The relationship between the ‘short- and long-term memory’ can be explained by means of a constant traffic of information or input from the ‘short-term memory’ (where the information is received) to the ‘long term memory’ (where information is checked, contrasted and maybe finally stored). By understanding the nature of this traffic of information, its speed and the obstacles that can be found along the way, we could explain a great lot about the learning process. It could be estimated that the speed of this traffic will be inversely proportional to the time it takes the information to get to the ‘long-term memory’. It seems that the speed of this traffic is one of the factors that could explain the difference between slow and fast learners. It is also crucial to understand the important role ‘attentional load’ plays in the speed of this process. The term RT (respond time, also used in psychology as ‘reaction time’) refers to the time ‘the traffic’ of information lasts from ‘short to long-term memory’.

Segalowitz’s (2003) description of ‘automaticity’ refers to an automatic process that requires minimal time. Similar to this notion of ‘automaticity’, the traffic of information implies not a dichotomy but rather a continuum that stretches from slow (very non-automatic) to fast (very automatic) traffic.

We may now ask the following question: Under which conditions will the ‘two-way traffic’ between the ‘long and short-term memory’ decrease? The answer may well be related to a decrease of attention and, therefore, physical effort. Thus, it would seem logical that when, for instance, we get tired, the traffic of information will slow down. The amount of information being processing will also slow down the traffic in the same way as a truck will be slower when loaded and faster when empty.

We should also consider that, in the ‘long-term memory’, there are different levels of consolidation of information: some information is more available than other information. Thus, when we say that something ‘sounds familiar’ or ‘rings a bell’, the information carried can be contrasted easily with the information stored, because the latter has either been stored lately or has had the chance to be contrasted with practice (Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Roemer 1993). We could think of the ‘long-term memory’ as an area with extremes at two opposite poles: on the one hand, there is the less solidified ground where information can be lost or forgotten, while on the other, we can have very well-grounded information. This is known in psychology as consolidation. Other authors have referred to this process as ‘fossilization’ (Johnson 1996).

III. Back-up examples of the theory proposed: communicative devices

This section will set out some communicative devices that occur on a daily basis through the modus operandi of memory. Examples include: correcting, implying or completing new information, the use of irony, sarcasm, hyperbole and stream-of-consciousness speech.

III.a. Correcting, implying or completing new information.

Having explained the relationship between ‘short- and long-term memory’ and how new information is processed, we can now explain how it is that we can understand, assume or deduce words or ideas that are not actually, physically said in a conversation. The ‘constant two-way traffic’ between the inner resources of the ‘short- and long-term memory’ allows us to complete information that has not been said. (E.g., we mentally correct a non-native speaker’s mistake, such as the -s missing in: “He live in London”.)

Through the ‘two-way traffic’ between the inner resources of the ‘short- and long-term memory’, we contrast the information received with that stored in our ‘long-term memory’. In the case mentioned, we perceive the mistake and we correct it in our minds. This process takes only a fraction of a second.

III.b. Irony, sarcasm, hyperbole.

The last edition of the Collins Cobuild Dictionary defines irony as: “a subtle form of humor which involves saying things that you do not mean”. The question, then, would be: Why do we understand irony? The information received in the ‘short-term memory’ is quickly contrasted with the information in the long-term memory: background information about the person being sarcastic in previous situations, now, the ‘proper’ context …etc.

Irony only works if, first of all, we have sufficient information stored in our ‘long-term memory’ to realize that what has been said is the opposite of the speaker’s intention. Furthermore, the speed of the ‘two-way traffic’ must be sufficient to allow the recipient of the information to respond appropriately. Even with similar background information, some individuals need more time than others to decode an ironic message. Here, there may be problems in the ‘two-way traffic’ between the inner resources of the ‘short- and long-term memory’. The connections are not fluent; the traffic is not constant. In this situation the receiver needs time to contrast the information obtained and to realize that what has been said does not carry the meaning of the words used. The same can be seen with sarcasm or hyperbole.

III.c. Intense stream of thoughts: distraction.

There are times when the ‘constant two-way traffic’ between the inner resources of the ‘short- and long-term memory’ may not be ‘two-way’. Teachers often find students staring at a fixed point and not listening. Some information placed in the ‘short-term memory’, when connected with the information stored in the ‘long-term memory’, may stir up other information stored in the ‘long-term memory’. The new information and connection can function as stimuli to provoke unlimited connections within the ‘long-term memory’. For example, when a teacher discusses a topic, which then gets processed in the student’s ‘long-term memory’, many other topics of varying relevance are brought to the student’s mind. Involuntarily, the student stops listening, stops taking in new information, and focuses on contrasting information already received and stored in the ’long-term memory’. One thought evokes another and, in seconds, the mind is far from the class and original topic. This phenomenon constitutes an involuntary and extremely intense presence of memories. Students who suffer from this type of distraction must be noted and specially addressed in the teaching, as their ‘long-term memory’ is constantly being activated, precluding focus on receiving new information for more than a few minutes. On the other hand we have an almost opposite phenomenon: Amnesia – obstacles in the ‘two-way traffic’[3] and/or in the ‘long-term memory’ to activate or associate memories.

IV. Model of analysis of input in memory

From the phenomena discussed above, we can derive the following possible model of information processing in memory.

[Fig.1]

When we receive the input from the environment, attention is an important factor for the input to be processed in the ‘short-term memory’. From there, the input goes through the ‘two-way traffic’ to the ‘long-term memory’. Before it arrives in the ‘long-term memory’, the input must pass a ‘decision making filter’ based on the self-interest of the individual. In other words, if the individual does not consider the new information relevant, it will be released or forgotten. The entire process is accompanied by the ‘attentional load factor’. The lower the attentional load, the slower the ‘traffic’, which increases the chances to release information. When the attentional load is low the information is involuntarily lost by distraction. The higher the attentional load, the faster the ‘traffic’, which increases the chances for the information to be considered for the ‘long-term memory’. The attentional load must be proportional to either the amount of information going from ‘short to long-term memory’ or to the newness of this information. The larger the amount, the more attentional load we need to invest.

In the ‘long term memory’ new information is contrasted and passes a second filter to be stored or updated. It is also used to update other information already stored in the ‘long-term memory’.

If the ‘long-term memory’ suffers from extra activation and an overwhelming presence of memories, which were not stored in a scale of consolidation, we deal with an intense stream of thoughts. Another related phenomenon is Amnesia (Baddeley and Wilson 2002). In our memory model, amnesia could be understood as a lack of stimulus to link memories in the ‘long-term memory’ or a lack of fluency in the ‘two-way traffic’. In other words, there is a blockage between the ‘short- and long-term memory’. The information once stored is not available; the ‘files’ have been lost.

Then the information goes back to the ‘short-term memory’ to be refreshed. For instance, sometimes we can lose track of a thought or a question we were asked. Then we go back to the ‘short-term memory’ trying to answer the question: Why did we go to the ‘long-term memory’ to search?

In the ‘long-term memory’ we also have our information or memories stored in different levels. A possible scale of consolidation ranges from information we never forget, such as the death of a relative, to information stored for a week, for example, until we take an exam, after which we may forget little by little that information that through the decision making we decided not to consolidate for the long-term.

Finally a response may be produced physically or verbally if the situation requires so. [4]

V. Ego boundaries

There are numerous criteria or dimensions to understand learning styles and describe learners: sensory-intuitive, visual-verbal, active-reflective, sequential-global, inductive-deductive (Felder and Henriques 1995). It seems that Ehrman ’s explanation of ‘ego boundaries and tolerance of ambiguity’ (1999) is closely related to our memory modus operandi since it describes learners’ attitude to new information and their willingness of storing or refusing new information. Ehrman’s concept (1999) also allows us to find a possible explanation to account for one of the factors to explain the multiple differences in learning between children and adults. ‘Thick ego boundary’ learners are subjects with very well settled information in the ‘long-term memory’ and show some resistance to new information or to compare new information with that which they already have. The information they have previously stored is like ‘Universal Truths’ (very well consolidated information) for them. We may say that in this case there is not fluent ‘two-way traffic’ between the inner resources of the ‘short- and long-term memory’.

‘Thin ego boundary’ learners pay a lot of attention to new information; therefore new material is willing to be stored in the ‘long-term memory’. They do not hesitate to update old material or to acquire new material in the ‘long-term memory’ if the incoming information is more relevant. We may say that ‘thin ego boundary’ learners have a constant ‘two-way traffic’ between the inner resources of the ‘short- and long-term memory’.

It is possible that Ehrman’s classification (1999) was too strict, and maybe most learners are a mixture between ‘thin and thick ego boundaries’ depending on the subject, situation and background. If we could prove that this notion of boundaries has a close relationship with age we could have an answer to explain differences between children and adults in the learning process. It is probable that there is a continuum between ‘thin and thick ego boundaries’; they imply some decrease in the elasticity process and less tolerance to new information with age. To support this assumption, Cowan & Kail (1996: 44) argue, in relation to speed, that age shows substantial differences on most speeded tasks: “Speed increases throughout childhood and adolescence, reaches a peak in young adulthood, and declines slowly thereafter”.

It makes sense then, if we think that adults present more resistance in updating information they have already stored in their memory, and this information, in most of the cases is like irrefutable principles. On the other hand, generally speaking children’s and teenagers' ideas are more malleable. In addition to the speed-age relation, Bialystok (2001: 90) refers to the adult mind as a ‘stable state’ and affirms that “Children’s early words and early meanings have a tentative existence on their own, as well as precarious connections to each other”.

VI. Pedagogical Implications

After providing a description of how the information is processed by the mind and presenting a schema of the developmental stages of processing information, a logical question arises from the pedagogical point of view: Why and how should teachers promote speed in the ‘two-way traffic’ between the inner resources of the ‘short- and long-term memory’?

By speeding up the ‘two-way traffic’ we are speeding up the learning process, while at the same time we are accustoming the mind to work at a certain speed that would be very important for the learner’s future challenges. Particularly interesting in children since it is similar to the ‘running-in of a car’, the first learning experiences will determine the success of the coming ones. I truly believe that the manner in which teachers could promote speed in the ‘two-way traffic’ between the inner resources of the ‘short- and long-term memory’ depends on the amount of commitment and motivation (Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Roemer 1993; Tomporowski & Tinsley 1996).

VI. a. Motivation

As pointed out by Brown (2000: 160): “Motivation is probably the most frequently used catch-all term for explaining the success or failure of virtually any complex task”. Undoubtedly the level of motivation will be inversely proportional to the level of lack of self-esteem, inhibition, anxiety and empathy. Motivation is not only a key factor in storing and maintaining new information in the memory, but also, the factor that may improve skill acquisition and soften the attentional load of learners. Motivation implies high levels of attention, a positive outcome of the ‘decision making’ filters of self-interest and a willingness to store new information.[5] In this paper we will not discuss instructors’ motivation since our departure point is to believe that instructors are motivated. (Unmotivated instructors rarely will enthuse their students). However, I want to point out the importance of motivated-enthusiastic teachers agreeing with Riel’s words (1990: 459): “When teachers get excited about a learning project, students share their teachers’ enthusiasm and the quality of the students’ work increases”.

A crucial factor to implement motivation in the classroom deals with the need to create a relax-and-participate atmosphere in the classroom. Maybe Stevick’s (1996) affirmation that success in learning depends less on materials, techniques and linguistic analyses, and more on what goes on inside and between people in the classroom, is a bit exaggerated but definitely makes us reflect on teaching. For this purpose,  Rogers’ (1983) definition of teachers as ‘facilitators’ is essential to promote self-esteem and motivation. Teachers are not the main character of the learning process; their secondary role must help, facilitate and assist the real protagonist of the process: the learner.

VI. b. Material: Affective data.

It is necessary to make new the material attractive to the students in order to help them maintain it. An important issue is variety of materials, not only to avoid monotony and repetition but also to keep the attention of all the learners – those who are audio-focused learners and those who are visual-focused learners, for example.

Related to Stevick’s (1996) concept of Affective Data, it is assumed that if students do not feel affection, needs or emotions towards the new material, it will be very difficult for them to keep the new information. That is, they will not change their internal sources. Therefore ‘affectivity’ is not only important but also essential in the learning process.

To improve the speed of the process and the quality of the received input, to make learners ‘open’ receptors of new information and to encourage them to store it in their minds, are issues that pedagogy has always stood for with different methodological approaches. As discussed in this paper, part of the success of storing new information is due to the possibility to check and connect the new information with that information already stored (already learned or experienced). Ausubel (1968) was aware of the importance of connections in our mind. In ‘Theory of Meaningful Learning’ (1968), he defines learning as a meaningful process of relating new events or items to already existing cognitive concepts or propositions hanging new items on existing cognitive pegs. Therefore to present familiar-related material is crucial for successful storing. If the new material is not connective to existing cognitive structure, we deal with what Ausubel (1968) called ‘Rote Learning’, and the material has great chances to be forgotten after a short period of time. In our schema this information will stay in the ‘short term memory’.

In order to present appealing information for students, we need to create authentic material. This material will help the students make connections with reality (real events, situations, conversations), will reduce the level of anxiety since they can relate the new information and, therefore, will increase motivation and the chances to acquire and retain the new information. Textbooks need to provide students with examples of communicative language that can be used in a real language situation. 

VII. Conclusion

This paper proposes a model of analysis for the stages in input processing, explains the occurrence of some communicative devices from the perspective of memory and provides some explanations for learning obstacles such as distraction, amnesia, etc. A relation between memory-flexibility and age has also been studied with the concept of ‘thin and thick ego boundaries’ (Ehrman 1999). Finally, some pedagogical implications are presented: the need to focus on motivation, authentic material and the role of teachers as ‘facilitators’ (Rogers 1983) in the classroom to speed up the process of learning among students.

If we, as teachers, want to perform successfully, we must know how the human mind assimilates, contrasts or stores new information. We must be aware of the different ways of receiving input, the process the information suffers till it is stored and saved in our memory. This paper provides the inside dimensions on how the receiver processes information. A teacher must always keep in mind that teaching on our side does not always imply learning on their side.

Still many questions remain unanswered. How can we accomplish an explanation for UG (Universal Grammar) and the innate capacity of producing structures of language? Shall we advocate for a third space in our mind whose role is not storing or contrasting information but producing possible structures? When learning a second language, why do the items in our first language come before those in our second language? Can this be explained through the process of consolidation that took place with our mother tongue? Do adults tend to fossilize while children’s ‘long-term memory’ is more elastic and flexible and therefore susceptible to changes? In bilingual cases, how is the mental organization of two languages different from that of one? How does each language connect to a system of meanings? Does each language activate different sets of memories and experiences? Can we say that Weinreich’s distinction (1953) between coordinate, compound and subordinate bilingualism has a correlation with the way the two languages are structured in our long-term memory?[6]

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